Airport Security: Effective Or Security Theater?

Airport security has been a topic of debate since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with many questioning the effectiveness of measures such as body scanners and liquid restrictions. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the US has been criticised as security theatre, with some arguing that their measures are invasive, ineffective, and inefficient. However, others argue that airport security has prevented further attacks and that new technologies and intelligence methods have improved safety. So, does airport security make us safer?

The TSA is ineffective at stopping terrorists

The TSA's security measures are also inconsistent. For example, fewer than 70 of the nation's airports have enhanced security features like full-body scanners, and even at airports with scanners, not every passenger is scanned. Some passengers can opt to go through metal detectors instead.

The TSA's technology is also ineffective. Body scanning machines do little more than traditional metal detectors and are a waste of money. Since their introduction, they have not intercepted a single explosive device. Instead, they are mostly responsible for detecting items like nail clippers, keys, and bottles of water.

The TSA's policies are also reactive and often a step behind terrorists. For example, terrorists used box cutters during the 9/11 attacks, so the TSA banned box cutters. Then terrorists used shoe bombs, so the TSA required everyone to take off their shoes. Now, terrorists are using liquid explosives, and the TSA has responded with a ban on all but the tiniest containers of liquids.

The TSA's measures also create bottlenecks at security checkpoints, which increase the risk of an attack. Long lines of travelers snaking through security create an ideal target for terrorists, who could simply detonate a bomb at the checkpoint to cause mass casualties.

In addition, the TSA's focus on airport security may be misplaced. As security expert Bruce Schneier notes, "The terrorist's goal isn't to attack an airplane specifically; it's to sow terror generally." By focusing solely on airports, the TSA may be diverting resources away from other potential targets, such as shopping malls, movie theaters, and stadiums.

Overall, the TSA's security measures provide a false sense of security, and there are more effective ways to deter, prevent, and impede would-be terrorists. For example, on-board safety measures like reinforced cockpit doors can thwart hijackers. New technologies, such as biometric identity verification, can also enhance the accuracy and efficiency of identity screening. Big data and data analytics also allow government agencies to identify and thwart potential threats before they even reach the airport.

Security theatre gives a false sense of security

The term "security theatre" was coined by security expert Bruce Schneier in his 2003 book, Beyond Fear. It refers to safety measures that are more about show than actual security. These measures are often implemented to reassure the public and create a sense of safety, but they may not be effective in preventing incidents.

In the context of airport security, security theatre can manifest in various ways. For example, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the United States has been criticised for its invasive measures, such as body scanners, pat-downs, and humiliating searches. While these measures may make passengers feel safer, they have also been accused of violating people's rights and invading their personal space.

Additionally, the TSA has been criticised for its reactive policies. For instance, after the 9/11 attacks, the TSA banned items such as box cutters and cigarette lighters. However, as critics point out, terrorists can simply switch to other weapons, such as shoe bombs or liquid explosives. The TSA's efforts to ban an ever-changing list of potential weapons seem futile in the face of determined attackers.

The TSA has also been criticised for its lack of professionalism and inadequate training. The position of a TSA agent does not require a high school diploma, and the turnover rate is high. This has led to concerns about the effectiveness of their security measures and their ability to deter terrorism.

Furthermore, the focus on airport security may simply shift the target for terrorists rather than prevent attacks altogether. As Mark Stewart, a professor at the University of Newcastle studying infrastructure protection from terrorist attacks, stated, "A deterred terrorist will just go elsewhere." This suggests that increasing security at airports may not deter attacks but rather push them towards other targets, such as shopping malls, movie theatres, or churches.

The effectiveness of airport security measures in preventing terrorism is questionable. Since 9/11, there have been several incidents where terrorists were able to breach security, and critics argue that intelligence and proactive policing are more effective tools in the fight against terrorism.

While airport security aims to provide safety and protect passengers, the extensive measures implemented by organisations like the TSA may provide a false sense of security. The focus on specific threats and reactive policies may be futile in the face of determined and adaptable terrorists. Prioritising intelligence and proactive measures could be a more effective strategy in ensuring public safety.

Security bottlenecks increase the risk of an attack

The long lines and crowds also make it easier for criminals to practice their craft. Thieves have found airport security checkpoints to be a virtual goldmine of valuables, including laptops, jewellery, and other items. They create distractions to part travellers from their belongings.

The bottlenecks also make it challenging to add further security measures. For instance, some airports have little space to install additional checkpoints. Staffing new checkpoints would also be difficult. During the long waits at American airports in May 2016, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) cited budget cuts as the reason for the delays, specifically, a reduction in the number of screeners.

The TSA has been criticised for its reactive policies, which some argue are ineffective and only serve to alienate travellers. Critics say that the TSA's measures only catch "stupid" terrorists and that a determined attacker could simply steal knives from post-security airport restaurants and bring them onto a plane.

The TSA has also been criticised for its lack of professionalism. The position does not require a high school diploma or GED and is seen as a stepping stone to a better career. The job is punctuated by boredom, and agents often horse around while on the job. Absenteeism is also common, with many agents not showing up for work yet still keeping their jobs. This means that at any given time, there are fewer agents available to do the job.

Intelligence is more effective than security theatre

The term "security theatre" was coined by security expert Bruce Schneier to describe security measures that are designed to create an impression of safety rather than provide actual security. These measures are often superficial and ineffective, addressing perceived threats rather than real ones. Airport security measures, such as those implemented by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the United States, have been criticised as security theatre.

• Intelligence-gathering can help prevent terrorist attacks before they happen: As Bruce Schneier points out, "That's how the British caught the liquid bombers...They never got anywhere near the plane. That's what you want—not catching them at the last minute as they try to board the flight." By focusing on intelligence, law enforcement can identify and stop potential terrorists before they even reach the airport.
• Knee-jerk reactive security procedures can be ineffective and alienating: Critics argue that the TSA's measures only catch "stupid" terrorists who use obvious methods that are easily detected. For example, the TSA banned box cutters after the 9/11 attacks, but critics argue that terrorists will simply switch to other weapons or targets. As Mark Stewart, a professor studying infrastructure protection from terrorist attacks, notes, "A deterred terrorist will just go elsewhere."
• Security theatre can create a false sense of security: By focusing on superficial measures, security theatre can leave individuals and organisations vulnerable to attacks. It can also lead to complacency, resource misallocation, and a diversion of efforts from actual threat mitigation. As Schneier warns, "The rest is security theatre."
• Intelligence can identify abnormal behaviour: Behavioural specialists and experts in airports study passengers for signs of abnormal behaviour, which can be an effective way to identify potential terrorists. While these experts mostly catch drug smugglers, their expertise has been valuable in the fight against terrorism.
• Intelligence can be used to enhance security measures: Upgraded intelligence measures, military spying, and government security initiatives are credited with preventing another large-scale terrorist attack similar to 9/11. These measures work in conjunction with other security protocols to enhance overall safety.
• Intelligence can help identify and address the root causes of terrorism: By gathering intelligence, law enforcement and government agencies can better understand the motivations and methods of terrorist organisations. This information can be used to develop more effective counter-terrorism strategies and address the underlying issues that contribute to terrorism.

Terrorists can easily breach airports

While airport security has been beefed up since 9/11, with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) now the exclusive security force at over 450 airports in the US, critics argue that terrorists can still easily breach airports.

Firstly, the TSA's security measures are inconsistent. Fewer than 70 US airports have enhanced security features like full-body scanners, and even at airports with scanners, not all passengers are required to be scanned, with some opting for metal detectors instead.

Secondly, the focus on security checkpoints creates bottlenecks, with long lines of travellers snaking through, creating an ideal target for terrorists to cause mass casualties by detonating a bomb.

Thirdly, there are many parts of the airport that are virtually untouched by security. Ticket counters, dining, and shopping concourses are open to the public, and in some cases, visitors are not screened before entering the airport or allowed onto the grounds without a ticket. This was highlighted in the 2016 attack on Istanbul Ataturk Airport, where the attackers initially tried to enter the terminal but were turned away at the security screening. They returned with long-range rifles from their suitcases and detonated their explosives on the arrivals and departures floors, causing mass casualties.

Additionally, critics argue that the TSA's reactive policies are ineffective. For example, after the 2001 "shoe bomber" incident, the TSA banned liquids, but terrorists then used liquid explosives in printer cartridges, leading to a ban on travelling with cartridges in carry-on luggage. This approach seems to be a game of catch-up, with terrorists always one step ahead.

Finally, the use of stolen passports is surprisingly common, and the TSA does not always check passports against the Interpol database of lost and stolen passports. Security experts have easily gained access to restricted areas of airports using fake boarding passes, highlighting the vulnerability of airports to determined terrorists.

In conclusion, while airport security measures may provide a sense of safety, there are still many ways for terrorists to breach airports, and a more proactive and comprehensive approach to security is needed to effectively deter and prevent attacks.

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